全文获取类型
收费全文 | 801篇 |
免费 | 107篇 |
国内免费 | 68篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 2篇 |
2022年 | 5篇 |
2021年 | 21篇 |
2020年 | 20篇 |
2019年 | 17篇 |
2018年 | 40篇 |
2017年 | 51篇 |
2016年 | 47篇 |
2015年 | 29篇 |
2014年 | 61篇 |
2013年 | 117篇 |
2012年 | 63篇 |
2011年 | 49篇 |
2010年 | 39篇 |
2009年 | 39篇 |
2008年 | 31篇 |
2007年 | 45篇 |
2006年 | 69篇 |
2005年 | 63篇 |
2004年 | 40篇 |
2003年 | 23篇 |
2002年 | 14篇 |
2001年 | 25篇 |
2000年 | 18篇 |
1999年 | 14篇 |
1998年 | 6篇 |
1997年 | 7篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 5篇 |
1994年 | 4篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1990年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有976条查询结果,搜索用时 140 毫秒
81.
Peter Gastrow 《African Security Review》2013,22(1):39-43
This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS. 相似文献
82.
Karen Winzoski 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):331-347
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the US chemical industry went from lobbying against the Geneva Protocol and promoting increased funding for chemical warfare to refusing to produce binary chemical weapons and assisting with the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—even though the treaty included provisions that could be costly to industry. What happened in those thirty years to make the US chemical industry reverse its position on chemical weapons? This article argues these changes were largely caused by the chemical industry's desire to reform the negative public image it had acquired due to its involvement in the Agent Orange scandal and other high-profile incidents during the 1970s and 1980s. The chemical industry's assistance with CWC negotiations may be explained after an examination of the US public policy literature, which argues that industry will support apparently costly regulations if doing so helps it repair a damaged public image and ensures greater profits in the long run. 相似文献
83.
Nicholas G. Evans 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):351-366
ABSTRACTScience and technology (S&T) review is key to anticipating developments in the life sciences that may benefit or run contrary to the aims of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It serves as a mechanism for both preparing against novel biological threats and identifying the best opportunities for developing and sharing the life sciences to the fullest extent. In the age of rapidly advancing biotechnology, S&T review needs to be wide ranging, involve a diverse set of inputs, and be transparent about its methods and data. This viewpoint considers four models of S&T review and their capacity to respond to the challenge of the life sciences: standing advisory boards; ad hoc working groups; peer review; and wikis. It then identifies a hybrid model that is suitably broad, diverse, and transparent. 相似文献
84.
Joshua Masters 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):347-361
As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation. 相似文献
85.
军备控制的目的是维护国家的安全和减少国家安全威胁.随着现代科学技术的发展和世界经济一体化进程的加快,国家安全威胁的因素与国家军事能力同步增长.尤其是现代信息技术的快速渗透和发展,不仅带来了安全隐患的增加,也加速了武器装备的更新换代,对国际军备控制产生了广泛的影响. 相似文献
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.